

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to any individual, entity, or specific course of action. This is U.S. Govt work. Use, reproduction, or disclosure of which is not subject to an interagency process is prohibited by law.

~~C-O-N-T-R-O-L-L-E-D~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSDB-3/657,597

SUBJECT Soliciting of Funds by the
Movimiento Insurreccional de
Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR)
for the Purchase of Two P-51's
or Similar Aircraft

DATE DISTR. 31 October 1963

NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCESDATE OF 25 September 1963
INFO.PLACE & United States, Miami
DATE ACQ. (10 October 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-3869

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports for over two years.

The following is the gist of a circular letter which Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, general coordinator of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR, Insurrectional Movement of Revolutionary Recovery), is sending to various Cuban exiles, requesting their financial assistance for the purchase of aircraft:

25 September 1963

Esteemed compatriot:

As you must have learned by the press, our organization has begun bombing the industrial and military targets of the Castro régime, and we believe that if we have the opportunity and necessary resources we will be able to continue our softening-up attacks for a period of 90 to 120 days, supplemented by infiltrations of arms and explosives, and that consequently we shall attain the fall of the Habana régime before the end of the coming year. We would not like to fall in the disgrace of the other organizations of accomplishing an attack every 10 or 12 months because we believe that this is in detriment to our cause rather than in its benefit. In order to be successful, in accordance with the experience gained, attacks against Castro by Cubans must have two indispensable qualities: be effective and most of all be consecutive. We believe that the boats, firing against the coasts, etc., etc.

~~C-O-N-T-R-O-L-L-E-D~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	NSK	OCB	IPB 42
REINGLANT	CINCSO	TREASURY	USIA	IANS				

(Refer Field dist. button indicated by "#")

SAS/EOI	13A9/9X	WE7/2R	MMI/VACY		UFG-3869
SAS/Intell	13A3/WAVE	WE/MADE			NP (AMOT-2)
SAS/R	13A3/40/100				CNDH-3/657,597
SAS/C1	2		CI/OPS/WH 12		
SAS/MON					COORDINATING INFORMATION
Total DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 4, PI 3, CA 1, DODS 1, BAS 10 (1), WH 1 (2)				LIAISON #	THURMAN J. C. COOPER